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This dissertation aims at presenting new empirical evidence regarding the relationship between 
unemployment risk and the corporate financing decisions of a firm. More precisely, the intent of 
the study is to understand how a variation in the costs of unemployment to the employees – using 
as a proxy the maximum unemployment insurance (UI) benefits a country provides - affects the 
levels of debt in a firm, as well as its operating performance. The findings indicate that there is no 
significant relationship between the UI benefits in one year and the changes in the capital structure 
of a firm the next year. Regarding the second question, empirical results suggest that there is a 
negative relationship between the two variables, i.e., an increase in the UI benefits will be 
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Esta dissertação visa apresentar novas evidências empíricas sobre a relação entre o risco de 
desemprego e as decisões de financiamento duma empresa. Mais precisamente, a intenção do 
estudo é entender como a variação do custo de desemprego para os empregados – utilizando como 
proxy, o subsídio máximo de desemprego que um determinado país oferece – afeta os níveis de 
dívida de uma empresa, bem como o seu desempenho operacional. Os resultados indicam que não 
existe uma relação significativa entre os subsídios de desemprego num ano e as mudanças na 
estrutura de capital de uma empresa no ano seguinte. Em relação à segunda questão, os resultados 
empíricos sugerem que existe uma relação negativa entre as duas variáveis, i.e., um aumento nos 
valores de subsídio de desemprego de um país estará associado a uma redução na rentabilidade de 
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In the last few decades, there has been an ever growing importance attributed to the human 
resources of a company (Zingales, 2000). As a consequence, this change in the paradigm altered 
the way a firm treats its employees. Several policies have been introduced so as to create a friendlier 
and more favorable environment for the workers, as in an organizations’ perspective, a satisfied 
and thus productive employee, is one of the most powerful drivers for success. 
However, an issue sometimes forgotten and incorrectly perceived as trivial has to do with the 
unemployment risk the workers have to bear. This is a sensitive topic as it creates several problems, 
not just for the employees but also for the firms. 
The aim of this paper is therefore to understand the impact the unemployment risk for the workers 
has on the capital structure of a firm. It will be used as a proxy for the workers’ exposure to the 
risk of unemployment, the variations in the unemployment insurance (UI) benefit laws of several 
European countries, from 2001 to 2016. In other words, it will be tested whether a change in the 
generosity of a country in terms of its UI benefits will affect the corporate financing decisions of a 
firm through the influence it has on the workers’ exposure to the risk of unemployment. 
Based on theories and previous literature further discussed in this paper, the hypothesis developed 
and studied is that firms will raise their levels of debt when they observe an increase in the 
generosity of the unemployment insurance benefits provided to its workers. The main idea is that 
more generous countries in terms of its unemployment insurance benefits create an environment in 
which layoffs are seen as less costly for the workers. Given this, the employees are bearing less 
unemployment risk and consequently they demand a lower wage compensation from the firms they 
work for (Topel, 1984). As firms now have less incentive to maintain their levels of debt low – so 
as not to increase the probability of financial distress and as a consequence, increase the 
unemployment risk for the employees – they are now able to increase their debt financing and thus, 
make a profit from the returns they get from the interest tax shields as well as other aids linked 
with higher levels of debt. 
A more in-depth explanation passes by the idea that a worker who perceives a higher risk of 
unemployment will be demanding a compensation for that additional risk, from the company he or 
she works for. This premium in the form of wages or extra benefits will be seen as a way of 
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compensating the worker for a potential job loss in the future (Topel, 1984; Abowd and 
Ashenfelter, 1981) and it will be higher, the higher the risk of unemployment. In order to deal with 
this matter, firms usually opt for conservative financial policies. That is owing to the fact that a 
capital structure with higher levels of debt will cause an increase in the probability of financial 
distress, thus, increasing the unemployment risk for the employees as well as the costs in 
compensating premiums for the company (Ofek, 1993). Subsequently, a conservative capital 
structure will lessen the exposure to unemployment risk as well as the costs both for the company 
and for the employees. However, in the case one sees an increase in the UI benefits of a country, 
the costs associated with unemployment will decrease both for the workers – who will receive a 
higher amount in case of unemployment – and for the firms – which will have to pay a lesser 
amount in compensations for unemployment risk. Hence, the firm will have less incentives to 
maintain low levels of debt and can, instead, benefit from interest tax shields. 
With the intent of testing the hypothesis that the levels of debt in a firm will increase when the risk 
of unemployment becomes less costly for the workers, three dependent variables will be tested so 
as to compare the results – debt-to-market value of assets, debt-to-book value of assets, and the 
natural logarithm of interest coverage. The independent variable for all the regressions will be the 
natural logarithm of the maximum total unemployment insurance benefit lagged one year since, as 
the study tries to understand how does this variable affects the leverage variables, it would be 
nonsensical to assume the change in the dependent variable would happen before the changes in 
the UI benefits, or even simultaneously. 
Another research question this paper intends to answer has to do with the relationship between the 
unemployment insurance benefits provided by a country and the operating performance of the firm. 
The study tries to understand whether an increase in the UI benefits of a country lagged one year, 
leads to an increase or to a decrease in the profitability of a firm. This is a relevant question since 
one could look at it in two distinctive ways. On the one hand, one could expect the relationship to 
be positive since an increase in the UI benefits will lead to a decrease in the unemployment risk as 
well as to the unemployment costs for the employees and for the firm. On the other hand, one could 
also consider a negative relationship, i.e., an increase in the UI benefits is associated with a decrease 
in the operating performance of a firm. That could be due to two different factors: firstly, although 
very indirectly, an increase in the unemployment insurance benefits could be associated with an 
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increase in the costs of the firm, in the sense that, an increase in the UI benefits will lead to an 
increase in the taxes paid, both by firms and by the households; secondly, a higher level of UI 
benefits could lead the employees of a firm to feel more protected in relation to their employment 
situation and that could affect negatively their performance and therefore the operating 
performance of the firm they work for. 
For this question, the dependent variable changes to the return on assets (ROA) of a firm, which 
will be used as a proxy for the profitability of the company in order to understand whether or not 
the operating performance of the firm is affected when there is an increase in the UI benefits the 
year before. 
On the whole, the aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence that there is a positive 
relationship between the generosity of a country in terms of the unemployment insurance benefits 
provided to the workers and the levels of debt financing. That is to say, the unemployment costs 
for the workers have an impact on the corporate financing of a firm - the lower the costs of 
unemployment the higher the levels of debt. In spite of the evident prominence of this subject, the 
unemployment costs for the employees, as well as the unemployment risk they have to bear, are 
still somewhat absent from theories in the field of corporate finance. While other studies, further 
discussed throughout this paper, have studied the interaction between corporate financing and labor 
costs focusing on how leverage is used as a strategy in the bargaining process, this paper goes the 
other direction. What sets this paper apart from most of the existing literature, especially in the 
European context, is the focus on how corporate financing is affected by the unemployment risk of 




2. Theoretical framework 
The risk of unemployment inevitably borne by the workers, constitutes an unemployment cost, 
sometimes incorrectly perceived as trivial. These costs could be associated with several different 
situations, for instance, there are large expenses associated with the actual process of searching for 
a new job (Mortensen, 1986), more precisely, these could be related with the long time workers 
usually have to wait before getting reemployed (Katz and Meyer, 1990). Furthermore, according 
to Lazear (2003) there is a certain limited amount of firm-specific skills an individual has, thus 
leading to a scarcity in job opportunities matching each individuals’ specific skills. Moreover, the 
costs could be associated with the model proposed by Harris and Holmstrom (1982), in which they 
stated that the workers have to be assumed to be risk averse and of unknown productivity or 
capability, meaning, only through experience the employers can really know about an employee’s 
capability, and thus, in an unemployment context, there is a lack of information regarding this. 
Several other labor market frictions can also be associated with the costs borne by the workers. 
Owing to the high costs of unemployment present when a worker is involuntarily let go, both the 
worker and the firm will suffer substantial changes in their behavior. Previous literature found that, 
for the worker to be willing to bear the risks of unemployment, he or she will require an extra 
compensation which could take the form of higher wages, better working conditions or several 
extra benefits. This extra compensation, a premium, is generally specified as compensating wage 
differential. Firms must, therefore, compensate the workers ex ante to bear the nontrivial costs of 
unemployment. More precisely, Abowd and Ashenfelter (1981) presented a model in which they 
proved that there is a competitive equilibrium wage rate which will vary according to the 
unemployment risk, concluding that the compensating wage differential varies across industries 
and is larger the higher the risk. Similarly, Topel (1984) found strong evidence that unemployment 
insurance benefits have a significant impact on both wage differences and unemployment. Other 
authors, such as Hamermesh and Wolfe (1990), while approaching it differently, have focused on 
this same idea that the workers must gain a premium to bear the risk of unemployment. The two 
authors also found strong evidence that a large percentage of differences in wage differentials (from 
14% to 41%) can be attributed to the divergences existing in unemployment risk between 
industries. Several authors have studied this subject looking at it in different ways, although, all of 
them have reached similar conclusions. 
15 
 
The size of the premium mentioned above will be higher, the higher the risk. One can say that an 
increase in risk can be associated not only with a higher probability of unemployment in a given 
firm, but also, with an increase in the costs incurred by workers during an unemployment spell, as 
well as with the worker’s degree of risk aversion. 
A crucial matter for this paper is whether or not these compensating wage differentials, associated 
with the unemployment risk, affect the firm’s financing decisions. Though, one could look at this 
in another perspective, i.e., what if an increase in the leverage of the firm has an impact in the 
unemployment risk? An increase in the financial leverage of a company will have an impact on the 
company’s probability of entering into financial distress. As previously studied by several authors, 
Ofek (1993) found that a firm’s response to financial distress has several dimensions, one of which 
being employee layoffs. Since a company in financial distress usually has to lay off workers so as 
to be able to meet its debt obligations, this will lead to an increase in the workers’ exposure to lay 
off risk. Given this, it is reasonable to assume that if a firm raises its levels of leverage, the costs 
associated with the compensating wage differentials will also increase, owing to the increase in the 
risk the workers will have to bear. Despite this conclusion, this paper goes the other direction. The 
aim is therefore to understand what the impact is, if any, the unemployment risk has on the firm’s 
financing decisions. 
The trade-off theory, which is the traditional theory of capital structure and the one in which this 
paper will be focused on, stresses the existence of an optimal level of equity capital and debt. This 
ideal level between equity and debt can only be achieved by a balance between tax benefits and the 
costs of financial distress (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973). In accordance with Myers (1984), a firm 
following this strategy will have to set an ideal debt-to-value ratio and then continuously move 
towards the goal. As stated in this theory, the total value of a levered firm will be equal to the total 
value of an unlevered firm plus the present value of the tax shields the firm will get from debt, less 
the present value of the costs of financial distress. In other words, the net present value of a debt 
issue will equal the net present value of the tax shields plus the net present value of the costs of 
financial distress. 




As aforementioned, an increase in the leverage used by a firm will lead to a higher probability of 
unemployment, which will inevitably raise the compensation that a worker will require to be 
willing to bear the extra risk. Based on this, Agrawal and Matsa (2013) provided empirical evidence 
for the presence of an additional term in the above mentioned equation (Eq. 1). The equation they 
proposed, Eq. 2, has a new term representing the variation in labor expenses. 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑉[𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒] =  𝑁𝑃𝑉[𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑]  +  𝑁𝑃𝑉[𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠]  +  ∆ 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 
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Whereas the second term in the equation represents the ex post costs in the case the firm truly 
becomes financially distressed, the last term of this equation represents the amount that a firm will 
spend on labor expenses, i.e., the costs paid ex ante by the company due to labor market frictions.  
It is important to bear in mind that this claim for a greater compensation does not mean workers 
have to directly observe the changes in the firm’s level of debt. The influence that financing 
decisions play on the risk of unemployment can be observed indirectly, through signals. It has been 
proven that people searching for a job can correctly perceive whether a firm is financially healthy 
or not (Brown and Matsa, 2012). Building on this, it is nonsensical to believe that the workers of 
the firm cannot accurately perceive these changes in the unemployment risk as well. 
Other papers have analyzed this relationship between UI benefits, or the risk of unemployment, 
and the corporate financing decisions, yet having different approaches. Linked with the growing 
importance of human capital that has been noticed in recent years, several authors have studied this 
relationship though looking at how employees and the way they are treated in the company affect 
corporate financing decisions. Bae, Kang and Wang (2011) have reached the conclusion that firms 
which treat their workers fairly, tend to have, and to maintain, lower levels of debt. Related with 
this, although more specific, Verwijmeren and Derwall, (2010) found that firms that take the costs 
of bankruptcy for their employees into account, usually operate with lower levels of debt. Both 
papers reached the same conclusion that low levels of corporate debt are associated with firms that 
care about their workforce, which is also associated with the conclusions of Chemmanur, Cheng 
and Zhang (2013) who found evidence that the labor costs of a firm will limit its use of debt. 
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On the other hand, on an entirely different perspective, Matsa (2010) concluded on his study that 
high levels of liquidity will likely lead the workers to increase their wage demands and 
consequently, a firm can choose to have higher levels of debt so as to be able to improve its 
bargaining power. 
The aim of this empirical study is therefore to analyze the changes in the unemployment insurance 
(UI) benefits given to the workers, as shocks to the last term of Eq. 2 and in that way, understand 
the impact on corporate leverage decisions. The main idea here is that if a worker is entitled for a 
more generous UI benefit, this means that the unemployment is less costly, and so, the worker will 
require a lower compensating wage differential and, most likely, this will enable firms to raise debt 





3. Data and empirical framework 
3.1 Unemployment insurance benefits and corporate borrowing 
Literature on the topic suggests that the decisions on the corporate financing of a firm are affected 
by numerous variables, including – but not limited to – the generosity of a country in terms of its 
unemployment insurance benefits. More precisely, Agrawal and Matsa (2013) found empirical 
evidence that, for US firms, when workers are eligible for more generous insurance benefits, firms 
are able to increase their levels of debt. Built on this idea, Graph 1 plots the relationship between 
the average market leverage of the firms in a given country and the natural logarithm of the 
maximum total unemployment insurance benefit an employee is entitled to. The graph shows a 
positive relationship between the two variables, that is, an increase in the logarithm of maximum 
total benefit corresponds to an increase in the average market leverage. However, one ought to bear 
in mind that the relationship shown in the graph may not be causal. 
 
Graph 1 - Relation between the average market leverage and the natural log of the maximum total potential UI benefits, 2016. The 
graph schemes the relationship between average market leverage and the log maximum total benefit in 2016. Average market 
leverage is computed as the average of total debt divided by total market value of the firm in each country. The logarithm of 
maximum total UI benefit was computed as the logarithm of the product of the maximum weekly UI benefit and the maximum 
number of weeks a country provides this benefit. Although small, the relation seems to be positive, that is, an increase in the 
logarithm of the maximum total benefit seems to be associated with an increase in the average market leverage of a country. The 
variables to compute the average market leverage were taken from Thomson Reuters Datastream, and the variables used to calculate 
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19 
 
With the intent to better understand the relationship between the two above mentioned variables, 
data on UI benefits was manually collected from the OECD “Benefits and Wages: Country policy 
descriptions”. For this research, some European Union countries as well as countries belonging to 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) were included. Detailed country-specific information 
about unemployment benefits as well as exhaustive information on particular policy parameters 
can be found on these documents from 2001 to 2016. For each of the countries under analysis, and 
for each year, it was extracted, when possible, the maximum weekly wage benefit allowance – log 
max benefit - along with the maximum number of weeks that a country provides UI benefits – log 
max duration. When it was not possible to find direct information on these variables, calculations 
or assumptions had to be made1. Given the vast discrepancy between countries’ legislation in terms 
of labor law, so as to homogenize, for both variables and for all the countries it was assumed that 
the worker in question was 45 years old, single and with no dependents, and with a 20-year 
employment record2. With the aim of measuring each countries’ generosity level in terms of 
unemployment benefits provided to a worker that became involuntarily unemployed, a new 
variable is introduced, the log max total benefit, which is the logarithm of the product of the 
maximum weekly UI benefit and the maximum number of weeks a country provides this benefit. 
Due to missing information on several countries, the total number of countries included in the study 
adds up to 20.  
The relative variation in the maximum total UI benefits per country, from 2001 to 2016, is 
displayed in Fig. 1. As aforementioned, the maximum total UI benefit is computed as the product 
of the maximum weekly benefit and the maximum amount of time the UI benefit is provided to the 
worker. The figure is presenting the quartile of each country’s variation in terms of its UI 
                                                          
1 For instance, the two unemployment insurance variables differ for East and West Germany, and so, given that it would be nearly 
impossible to understand whether a firm is from one side or the other, it was assumed that the values for West Germany represent 
the values for Germany as a whole. Moreover, assumptions had to be made regarding some missing years: For 2002, the values for 
both variables were missing for Ireland and Italy and so it was assumed the same values as in the previous year, 2001. The same 
happened for the year 2016, for Ireland. Finally, Belgium presented no limit duration for the workers to receive UI benefits and 
therefore, it was assumed that this value was the same as Iceland, corresponding to the county with the highest maximum duration 
in weeks (261 weeks). Other less relevant assumptions were made. See Section 8 - “Appendices” to visualize the tables with all 
information. 
2 For Norway, it was also assumed that the income from work amounted for at least twice the basic amount (as opposed to less than 
twice, so as to be more in line with the countries that are not discriminating on this and for which the maximum was given).  
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generosity; a larger increase in the 
total UI benefits is shown in a darker 
shade and a smaller increase - or in 
some countries a negative variation 
– in a lighter shade. Portugal, 
Denmark, and Germany present a 
negative variation, however, it is 
worth mentioning that if in the 
picture (Figure 1) it was only 
depicted the maximum weekly 
benefit, the variation on all countries 
would be positive, as the negative 
variation in these countries comes 
from a decrease in the maximum 
duration and not a decrease in the 
weekly benefit – comparing 2016 
values with 2001 values. The country 
that presented the largest increase in 
relative values was Switzerland, with 
a variation of over 276% from 2001 to 2016.  
To better understand the magnitude of the variations over the years, Graph 2 shows the frequency 
each interval of variations happens from one year to the next one. By analyzing the data included 
in the graph, one can conclude that the vast majority of the variations in unemployment insurance 
benefits are from 0% to 25% (neither the value are included in the interval), each year. It is also 
worth noting that a variation of exactly 0% (i.e., no variation) from one year to the next one 
constitutes around 24% of the country-year observations. Overall, the number of countries 
increasing unemployment benefits was superior to those decreasing them. 
With the purpose of exploring the relationship between the costs of unemployment in each country 
and a firm’s corporate financing decisions, data and information on a firm’s balance sheet as well 
as income statement were also employed and obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The 
Figure 1 - Relative variation in each country's maximum total unemployment 
insurance benefit, 2001-2016. The maximum total UI benefit is computed as 
the product of the maximum weekly benefit and the maximum duration. The 
figure exhibits larger increases in UI benefits in darker shades. Information 
regarding these variables was extracted from the OECD “Benefits and Wages: 




sample used in this study includes firms from all industries, excluding financials and utilities, with 
non-missing observations. 
 
Graph 2 – Frequency of the variation in the distribution of each country’s maximum total unemployment insurance benefit, from 
2001 to 2016. Information regarding these variables was extracted from the OECD “Benefits and Wages: Country policy 
descriptions”. 
 
Panel regression analysis is used to study the possible relation between financing policies at a firm 
level and the unemployment insurance benefits in each country. For this, the following regression 




=  𝛼1𝐿𝑁(𝑀𝐴𝑋 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐼𝑇)𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡𝛽 + 𝜈𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 
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Particularly, 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a variable that represents the financial debt in a firm i, in a European 
country j, and in a given year t, and 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑡 measures the market value of assets once 
again of the firm i, country j, and year t. Thus, the dependent variable, expressed as debt divided 
by a firm’s total market value of assets is created as a function of the logarithm of the maximum 
total UI benefit in the preceding year, a set of control variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡, firm fixed effects 𝜈𝑖 , country 





1,4% 0,4% 0,0% 0,7%
< -50% -50% to -25% -25% to 0% = 0% 0% to 25% 25% to 50% 50% to 75% 75% to 100% ≥ 100%
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For the sake of comparison, the same regression will be run with other dependent variables. The 
debt-to-book value of assets will be used given that, even though market leverage is usually more 
in line with the theoretical hypothesis stating that firms aim for an ideal equilibrium among the tax 
shields from debt, the ex post costs of financial distress, and the ex ante costs that come from the 
extra compensation given to the employees by the firm due to unemployment risk. The other 
dependent variable that will be tested is the logarithm of interest coverage. The latter variable was 
chosen since measuring leverage using the interest coverage ratio as opposed to other leverage 
ratios such as debt-to-market or debt-to-assets, will introduce very different results if a firm is in 
an early stage of life or if it is likely to grow in the near future. For instance, if a firm is in its 
earliest stages of life, the cash flows will be expected to grow in the future. If one uses a debt-to-
assets ratio, low levels of debt will be achieved as a result, since the debt will be low in relation to 
the future cash flows. However, when considering the interest coverage instead, one will get high 
levels of debt, as the interest payments required will be larger than the current cash flows. In this 
study, it is used this variable in logs in accordance with the paper of Faulkender and Petersen 
(2006), in order to take into consideration the relatively greater significance of equal variations in 
percentage at low levels of interest coverage. 
The set of controls 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 comprise several financial variables and ratios frequently used in leverage 
regressions, particularly, log of sales (which is used as a proxy for the size of the firm), market-to-
book-ratio (proxy for investment opportunities), proportion of fixed assets (so as to account for 
potential collateral), return on assets (ROA; as a proxy for profitability) and lastly, the modified 
Altman Z-score (probability of bankruptcy)3. Furthermore, this term also includes controls for 
macroeconomic conditions, namely, each country’s unemployment rate together with each 
country’s GDP growth rate, both variables obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Summary 
statistics for all the dependent and independent variables as well as the controls can be found in 
Table 1. In order to clear the data all financial variables – both the dependent variables and the firm 
financial controls – were winsorized at 1% tails. 
                                                          
3 These variables were chosen based on the study of Harris and Raviv (1991). The modified Altman Z-score was computed as 
3.3












in accordance with Mackie-Mason (1990).  
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Table 1 – Summary statistics. The sample presented in the table comprises firm-year observations from 2001 to 2016, in 20 European 
countries. The unemployment insurance variables were extracted from the OECD “Benefits and Wages: Country policy 
descriptions”. Dependent variables, firm financial controls and macroeconomic controls were taken from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. This sample includes firms from all industries, excluding utilities and financials, with non-missing observations. All 
financial variables – dependent variables as well as controls – are winsorized at 1% tails. 










Panel A: Dependent variables         
         
Total debt/market value 44,359 0.177 0.177 0.000 0.023 0.132 0.276 0.741 
Total debt/book value 49,725 0.216 0.204 0.000 0.036 0.177 0.329 0.969 
Log interest coverage 35,214 2.567 1.573 -0.912 1.582 2.335 3.317 7.825 
         
Panel B: UI variables         
         
Log max benefit 104,144 5.702 1.259 3.163 4.413 5.802 6.647 7.821 
Log max duration 104,144 4.078 0.565 2.565 3.807 4.043 4.605 5.565 
Log max total benefit 104,144 9.780 1.597 6.766 7.752 9.924 11.072 12.079 
         
Panel C: Firm financial controls         
         
Proportion of fixed assets 49,196 0.247 0.241 0.000 0.044 0.176 0.377 0.942 
Log sales 49,098 12.140 2.707 4.277 10.456 12.234 13.930 18.146 
Return on assets (ROA) 50,463 -0.040 0.286 -1.817 -0.027 -0.028 0.068 0.335 
Market-to-book ratio 45,463 2.383 3.334 -4.272 0.834 1.472 2.710 22.435 
Z-score 38,960 1.102 2.518 -12.963 0.737 1.537 2.297 5.176 
         
Panel D: Macroeconomic controls         
         
GDP growth 104,144 2.014 2.515 -9.130 0.950 2.080 3.600 25.560 
Unemployment rate 102,648 7.863 4.203 1.000 5.100 7.400 8.900 27.480 
 
Describing the generosity of each country, Panel B in Table 1 represents the UI benefit variables. 
It is important to bear in mind that the values presented in the table include the statistics for all the 
sample (firm-year observations) and as such, for instance the mean for the log max benefit - which 
is around 5.7 and corresponds to approximately 299.45 Eur per week4 - does not represent the real 
average from 2001 to 2016 for all the countries, but instead the average of the entire sample and 
thus, it is biased due to the uneven number of firms used in each country. Given this, and for the 
                                                          
4 All the presented values in Table 1 are unadjusted for inflation. 
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sake of transparency, Table 2 provides the real values for the descriptive statistics of the UI benefit 
variables, i.e., adjusted for inflation5.  
Table 2 – Summary statistics. The sample presented in the table comprises country-year observations from 2001 to 2016, in 20 
European countries. The unemployment insurance variables were extracted from the OECD “Benefits and Wages: Country policy 
descriptions”. 










UI variables (real)         
         
Maximum benefit (Eur/Week) 320 556.64 574.09 35.41 145.60 343.42 791.28 2539.46 
Maximum duration (Weeks) 320 84.39 64.05 13.00 39.00 56.00 104.00 261.00 
Maximum total benefit (Eur) 320 47,107.26 47,728.25 1,045.07 5,950.62 28,817.11 76,568.61 218,972.70 
 
When looking at 320 observations corresponding to the country-year observations instead of the 
firm-year observations, the mean of the maximum benefit becomes 556.64 Eur per week instead. 
The minimum value for this variable corresponds to Poland in 2001 and the maximum UI benefit 
corresponds to Switzerland in 2016. For the maximum duration variable, the minimum value 
corresponds to Hungary, from 2012 to 2016, with a decrease of approximately 33.3%, from 39 
weeks in 2011. The maximum value corresponds to Belgium where, as previously explained, there 
is no limit in its maximum duration. Lastly, regarding the last UI variable, the maximum total 
benefit reaches its lowest value in 2012 for Hungary, and its highest value in 2002, in France. 
Looking only at 2016 values (adjusted for 2018 prices), the highest value for the maximum total 
benefit corresponds, once again, to France with 182,807.93 Eur. 
3.2 Unemployment insurance variables and the operating performance of a firm 
The hypothesis in Section 3.1 proposed that variations in the generosity of a country in terms of its 
UI benefits affect the firms’ corporate financing decisions. This impact in the firms’ capital 
structure happens owing to the changes in the exposure to unemployment risk that the workers 
experience. As mentioned previously, workers anticipate they will have to bear significant 
unemployment costs and thus require a premium in their wages to compensate for the ex-ante costs. 
                                                          
5 In Table 2, both the values included in the maximum benefit per week and the maximum total benefit for all the countries were 
adjusted for November 2018 inflation levels – except for Poland which was adjusted for October 2018 inflation values. Table 8 in 
Section 8 – “Appendices” presents both the inflation levels and the adjusted values for the country-year observations. 
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Hence, this compensation is higher the higher the debt of the firm, since higher debt increases the 
risk of financial distress of the firm and therefore the risk of unemployment for the employees.  
Based on this, one could assume that an increase in the unemployment benefits of a country – 
through the decrease in the unemployment costs both for the employees and for the firm – will be 
associated with an increase in the profitability of a firm. Nonetheless, as previously mentioned, this 
may not be the case. One could also assume that the relationship is negative owing to either the 
indirect costs associated with an increase in the taxes paid by the firm and the households, or due 
to the decrease in the employees productivity owing to a decrease in the pressure to maintain their 
jobs.   
Based on this idea, another question this paper tries to answer is whether or not the profitability of 
a firm is affected when there is a variation in the UI benefits. For this, Eq. 4 will be run, in which 
return on assets is used as a proxy for a firm’s profitability. 
 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁 𝑂𝑁 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼1𝐿𝑁(𝑀𝐴𝑋 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐼𝑇)𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡𝛽 + 𝜈𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡  6 
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Finally, the standard errors in all the presented regressions as well as for Section 3.1 will be adjusted 
for clustering at a country level. That is owing to the fact that the unemployment insurance benefits 
will vary in each country and as such, the residuals will most likely be correlated and the standard 
errors biased (Petersen, 2009). This method will, as a result, correct for possible correlations in 
unobserved conditions which vary across time and affect the firms within each country. 
  
                                                          





4.1 Unemployment insurance benefits and corporate borrowing 
In order to understand the relationship between the generosity of a country in terms of its 
unemployment insurance benefits and the corporate financing decisions a firm makes, several 
regressions were run. The results for the relation between two debt ratios - total debt divided by 
the market value of assets (Panel A) and total debt divided by the book value of assets (Panel B) – 
and the  natural log of the maximum total unemployment insurance benefit entitled to a worker on 
the year before, are shown in Table 3. Starting by analyzing Column 1, Panel A, one can see that a 
100 log point increase in the maximum unemployment insurance benefit will be associated with a 
2.4 percentage point growth in the average debt-to-market value. These findings are in line with 
the hypothesis suggested above - that there is a positive relationship between the two variables. 
This column controls for both firm and year fixed effects, i.e., it guarantees that the regression will 
present the relationship between the generosity of a country’s UI benefits and the average changes 
in capital structure of the firms, after taking into consideration simultaneous macroeconomic 
factors as well as leverage trends possibly influencing both variables. Nevertheless, this relation is 
not statistically significant. 
After controlling for macroeconomic indicators (Column 2) as well as firm financial variables 
(Column 3), the results remain in line with the literature, showing a positive relation between the 
leverage ratio and the logarithm of maximum total benefit lagged one year. The coefficients in both 
cases became significantly lower. However, once again, the relation shown is not statistically 
significant at, at least, 10% level. Nonetheless, all control variables, both in Column 2 and Column 
3, are statistically significant either at the 5% or 1% level, suggesting the variables chosen are 
effective in controlling for observed economic factors. 
Finally, when accounting for country fixed effects - that is, ensuring the relationship presented by 
the regression is between the unemployment insurance benefits of a given country and the average 
changes in the capital structure of a firm in that same country – the results are very similar to the 
ones obtained in the previous column, Column 3. 
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Table 3 – Capital structure of the firm and unemployment insurance benefits. The table provides a summary of the results obtained 
from firm-panel regressions of total debt-to-total market value of assets on the natural log of the maximum total potential 
unemployment insurance benefit available in a given country 1-year lagged. Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. The 
standard errors in all regressions are provided in parenthesis and are corrected for clustering at the country level. ***, ** and * 
represent the statistical significance of the variables at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The estimation method is OLS, that 
is, ordinary least squares. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Total debt/market value     
Log max total benefit t-1 0.024 0.010 0.008 0.008 
 (0.025) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) 
     
Proportion of fixed assets   0.148*** 0.183*** 
Log sales   0.021*** 0.017*** 
Market-to-book ratio   -0.005*** -0.005*** 
Return on assets   -0.025** -0.021** 
Modified altman Z-score   -0.011*** -0.011*** 
GDP growth  -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
Unemployment rate  0.004** 0.003** 0.003** 
     
Constant -0.052 0.044 -0.198 -0.095 
Number of observations 42,129 42,002 32,406 32,406 
R-squared (within) 0.04 0.06 0.15 0.15 
     
Control variables     
Macroeconomic indicators No Yes Yes Yes 
Firm financial controls No No Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes7 
Country fixed effects No No No Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 
For Table 4 – using total debt-to-book value as a dependent variable instead – the results are once 
again positive, though the coefficients shown are not statistically significant for none of the 
columns and the values are quite small. Most of the control variables are statistically significant at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level. When including all controls, Column 3, and adding country fixed effects 
as well, Column 4, the results became even smaller, with values close to zero. Hence, one can 
conclude that there is no significant relationship between the variables nor they are economically 
meaningful. 
                                                          
7 When using country fixed effects, it is not possible to use firm fixed effects. This happens because firm fixed effects explore 
within firm identification and the firms’ countries do not vary over time. Hence, in reality it was used firm random effects. 
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Table 4 - Capital structure of the firm and unemployment insurance benefits. The table provides a summary of the results obtained 
from firm-panel regressions of total debt-to-total book value of assets on the natural log of the maximum total potential 
unemployment insurance benefit available in a given country 1-year lagged. Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. The 
standard errors in all regressions are provided in parenthesis and are corrected for clustering at the country level. ***, ** and * 
represent the statistical significance of the variables at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The estimation method is OLS, that 
is, ordinary least squares. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Total debt/book value   
Log max total benefit t-1 0.012 0.003 0.000 0.000 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
     
Proportion of fixed assets 0.161*** 0.187*** 
Log sales   0.021*** 0.021*** 
Market-to-book ratio  -0.001 -0.001 
Return on assets  -0.009 -0.005 
Modified altman Z-score  -0.025*** -0.025*** 
GDP growth -0.003*** -0.025*** -0.003*** 
Unemployment rate 0.003* 0.003** -0.003** 
     
Constant 0.118 0.159 -0.087 -0.039 
Number of observations 47,334 47,204 32,406 32,406 
R-squared (within) 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.12 
     
Control variables    
Macroeconomic indicators No Yes Yes Yes 
Firm financial controls No No Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes7 
Country fixed effects No No No Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 
Finally, even though a considerable part of the literature on this subject focuses on market leverage, 
if a worker is worried about the firm he or she works in becoming financially stressed, another 
essential variable to consider is the firm’s interest coverage. Calculated by dividing the operating 
earnings before depreciation by the interest expense of a firm, this ratio will measure the ability the 
firm has to honor its payments on its outstanding debt. In Table 5, we can look at the relationship 
of the logarithm of interest coverage and the generosity of the countries in terms of UI benefits. 
Controlling for year and firm fixed effects for all regressions, this relationship between interest 
coverage and the generosity of a country in terms of UI benefits is negative. These results are once 
again consistent with the literature in the sense that an increase in the log max total benefit in one 
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year will be associated with a decrease in the log interest coverage in the following year, although, 
not statistically significant for the OLS regressions. 
On the whole, by analyzing all specifications both in Table 3 and 4, one can conclude that, even 
though the firms seem to increase their levels of debt as a fraction of assets as well as to decrease 
their levels of interest coverage when there is an adoption of more generous laws by countries, the 
relationship shown is not statistically significant for neither of the regressions run. In other words, 
no significant associations can be found between the two variables. Hence, the empirical findings 
are not consistent with the conclusions obtained by Agrawal and Matsa (2013) – which established 
a statistically significant relationship between the two variables, nonetheless for US firms instead.  
 
Table 5 - Capital structure of the firm and unemployment insurance benefits. The table provides a summary of the results obtained 
from firm-panel regressions of the logarithm of interest coverage on the natural log of the maximum total potential unemployment 
insurance benefit available in a given country 1-year lagged. Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. The standard errors 
in all regressions are provided in parenthesis and are corrected for clustering at the country level. ***, ** and * represent the 
statistical significance of the variables at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The estimation method is OLS, that is, ordinary 
least squares. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Log interest coverage     
Log max total benefit t-1 -0.145 -0.052 -0.004 -0.008 
 (0.159) (0.118) (0.093) (0.094) 
     
Proportion of fixed assets   -0.514*** -0.568*** 
Log sales   -0.119*** -0.101*** 
Market-to-book ratio   -0.002 -0.004 
Return on assets   7.479*** 7.784*** 
Modified altman Z-score   0.272*** 0.252*** 
GDP growth  0.060*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 
Unemployment rate  -0.020 -0.021** -0.019** 
     
Constant 3.585** 3.191*** 3.669*** 3.704*** 
Number of observations 33,492 33,411 25,781 25,781 
R-squared (within) 0.03 0.04 0.31 0.31 
     
Control variables     
Macroeconomic indicators No Yes Yes Yes 
Firm financial controls No No Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes7 
Country fixed effects No No No Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS 
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The results obtained may be due to several reasons. There may be, de facto, no causality in the 
relation between the two variables. Alternatively, assuming there is a causal relationship between 
a change in a firm’s levels of debt and a variation in the UI benefits of a country, the results 
achieved might be due to bias in the data. Owing to the assumptions made, the bias may come 
especially from the unemployment insurance variables8. In addition, another issue these results 
may have comes from the fact that, in this study, firms are considered in the country where its 
headquarters are located. In the (most likely) case that a firm is actually present in several different 
countries other than where it is headquartered, that firm will not just be subject to the laws of the 
country in which its headquarters are located but also to the laws of the countries where its other 
plants are. These issues may attenuate the estimates obtained. Finally, the controls used in the 
regressions may also fail to be exogenous, which is a possibility given that these variables consist 
on potentially endogenous features of the companies (Wooldridge, 2002). 
4.2 Unemployment insurance benefits and the operating performance of a firm 
With the aim of understanding the relationship between a variation in UI benefits and the operating 
performance of a firm, a regression - with the return on assets of a firm as a dependent variable and 
the log max total benefit 1-year lagged - was run. The estimates for the regression are represented 
in Table 6. As opposed to the conclusions reached by Agrawal and Matsa (2012) – who found no 
evidence that a firm will show poor operating performance following an increase in the UI benefits 
– the results achieved show that there is a negative relationship between the two variables, i.e., a 
100 log point increase in the maximum UI benefit will be associated with a 3.2 percentage point 
decay in the ROA. The results shown are statistically significant at the 10% level, for Column 1 
and Column 2, and statistically significant at the 5% level for Column 3, with all the controls. Firm 
and year fixed effects are present in all the regressions of Table 6. 
                                                          
8 Some of the assumptions were already mention in Section 3.1. The UI variables might include bias given that, when extracted, for 
the sake of homogenization, it was assumed for both variables that the employee in question was 45 years old, single and with no 
dependents, and with a 20-year employment record. Unfortunately, it was not possible to make sure the data collected for the two 
variables in all countries followed these constraints, as for instance, some of the countries did not show discrimination in terms of 
age, and just provided a maximum number for both variables. 
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Table 6 – Profitability of a firm and unemployment insurance benefits. The table provides a summary of the results obtained from 
firm-panel regressions of the return on assets of a firm (ROA) on the natural log of the maximum total potential unemployment 
insurance benefit available in a given country 1-year lagged. Year and firm fixed effects are included in all regressions. The standard 
errors in all regressions are provided in parenthesis and are corrected for clustering at the country level. ***, ** and * represent the 
statistical significance of the variables at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
The results obtained are perhaps somewhat surprising. Even though, when there is an increase in 
UI benefits the firm has a potential increase in its costs due to the extra taxes paid, this is an utterly 
indirect channel. Moreover, as specified above, the results could also have to do with a decrease in 
the productivity of the employees owing to an increase in their security in terms of unemployment 
costs. Conversely, it would be only logical to assume that despite this possible increase in costs as 
well as decrease in productivity, an increase in the UI benefits is ultimately good both for the work 
environment and for the company as a whole, thereby leading to a firm being in a more 
advantageous position instead of worse off. Furthermore, in the case there is an increase in UI 
benefits, the employees will actually be demanding lower compensations for the risk of 
unemployment thus questioning the results obtained in Table 6. 
The results achieved could be due to several reasons. The sample used includes data on 20 
European countries from 2001 to 2016. This sample therefore included several years of crisis, 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Return on assets (ROA)    
Log max total benefit t-1 -0.032* -0.027* -0.019** 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.008) 
    
Proportion of fixed assets   -0.016 
Log sales   -0.004 
Market-to-book ratio   -0.0004 
Modified altman Z-score   0.089*** 
GDP growth  0.004*** 0.002*** 
Unemployment rate  0.000 0.001 
    
Constant 0.230 0.231* 0.104 
Number of observations 48,048 47,920 32,814 
R-squared (within) 0.01 0.01 0.49 
    
Macroeconomic indicators No Yes Yes 
Firm financial controls No No Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
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which may be tampering the results significantly, leading one to believe that an increase in the 
unemployment benefits of a country may have lead a decay in the profitability of its firms, although 
this may not be causal. One could solve this problem by adding country-year fixed effects 
simultaneously to a regression that way considering national trends. Though, this is not conceivable 




5. Limitations and possible future research 
As it would be expected, this paper presents several limitations and room for improvement. Some 
limitations have already been mentioned in previous sections. For instance, some of these 
restrictions include the fact that some assumptions had to be made regarding the unemployment 
insurance variables due to missing information, consequently leading to possible bias in the data. 
Additionally, another issue already mentioned had to do with the idea that the firms are linked to a 
country based where the company’s headquarters are located and, probably the vast majority of the 
firms under analysis, actually have plants in several different countries and not just where the 
company is headquartered. This creates bias since these firms will be subject to the laws of more 
than one country and this study is not be able to account for this. A possible solution for this issue 
would be for example to try to exclude from the sample firms that have a more dispersed workforce, 
geographically speaking. Although, this may not be a feasible solution, one way to try to minimize 
the error could be to only exclude certain industries known to have a more dispersed workforce, 
for example, the industry of transportation, as well as wholesale and retail. 
Furthermore, another possible problem comes from the fact that it was assumed that the 
unemployment insurance benefits provided to a worker in case of unemployment were a precise 
measure for the worker’s exposure to unemployment risk. Even though this variable may be a good 
measurement proxy, it is not foolproof.   
Moreover, an important limitation has to do with the fact that unobserved variables, other than the 
ones controlled for in this study, could affect the capital structure and financing decisions of the 
firm. An example of a variable that most likely affects corporate financing decisions and that it is 
not included in the controls would be the amount of taxes paid by each firm. This variable is not 
incorporated in the control variables as it not only varies from country to country but also within 
each country. 
So as to improve the paper, several additional researches could be conducted. For instance, one 
could try to focus on firms with tight financial constraints, since, in those companies, the workers 
have to face a higher risk of unemployment, and thus, variations in the unemployment insurance 
benefits of a country ought to have a greater influence on the decisions in corporate financing. 
Agrawal and Matsa (2013) tested this for US firms, using as a measure the size of the firm, the 
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level of operating cash flows and the absence or not of payments in dividends, and found strong 
evidence that an increase in UI benefits leads to an increase in debt in these firms. 
Additionally, another research question one could add could be related to whether or not bordering 
countries have any influence on the relationship between a country’s UI benefits and the decisions 
on corporate financing. 
One could also focus on several other situations in which the workers have to face greater 
unemployment risk, examples for this include industries in which the employees face greater labor 
intensity - which is also related with higher layoff propensity - as well as industries known to pay 
lower wages to its employees. Both these situations could change significantly the estimates in the 





The purpose of this study was to provide new empirical evidence in the field of corporate finance. 
The relationship between corporate financing decisions and unemployment risk is still a topic quite 
underexplored, especially in the European context. The main research question this paper tries to 
answer is whether or not there is a relationship between the capital structure of a firm in a given 
country, and the unemployment costs for the employees in each firm. More precisely, by exploiting 
changes in the unemployment insurance benefits of a country as shocks to the unemployment costs 
the workers have to bear, the hypothesis explored is that, firms will increase their levels of debt 
when they observe an increase in the generosity of the UI benefits, provided by a country. 
Included in the study are firms from all the industries, excluding financials and utilities, from the 
year 2001 to 2016. The sample includes 20 European firms, including firms from the European 
Union (EU) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).  
The conclusions taken do not support the hypothesis that there is a positive impact in the levels of 
debt in a given firm, when there is a positive shock in the UI benefits of a country. The estimates 
indicate that the relationship between the variables is positive, although, not significant at, at least, 
the 10% level. More specifically, the relationship between the debt-to-market value of assets and 
the UI benefits lagged one year of a country, as well as the relationship between the debt-to-book 
value of assets and the UI benefits lagged one year, were both shown positive, though, both not 
significant, and the latter relationship presented utterly small values. Additionally, the estimates 
indicated that the relationship between the natural logarithm of interest coverage and the generosity 
of a country in terms of its UI benefits the year before is negative, which is expected and in line 
with the literature, nonetheless, once again, showing no significant causality between the two 
variables. The conclusions drawn are similar for all the regressions both with no control variables, 
using macroeconomic controls, and using financial controls, as well as firm, year, and country fixed 
effects. 
Another research question was explored in this study. The aim was to understand what the 
relationship was, if any, between the unemployment insurance benefits and the operating 
performance of a firm. The idea was that, an increase in the UI benefits could lead to either a 
decrease in the profitability of a firm - indirectly through an increase in the taxes paid by firms and 
households in order to support the extra benefits, or through a decrease in the productivity of the 
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employees – or it could lead to an increase in the profitability of a firm - due to the decrease in the 
compensation firms have to pay as well as owing to the general extra motivation the workers gain 
when they observe an increase on benefits. 
Based on the results, one can conclude that there is a negative relationship between the two 
abovementioned variables, that is, when there is a positive variation in the unemployment insurance 
benefits of a country in one year, the return on assets of a firm (ROA) the next year – used as a 
proxy for the profitability of a firm – will decrease. The relationship proved significant at the 10% 
level, both without using control variables and using macroeconomic controls, and significant at 
5% level when using both financial and macroeconomic control variables. The illustrated 
conclusions are not, once again, in line with previous literature. Agrawal and Matsa (2013) found 
that increases in the unemployment insurance benefits have no significant relation with a firm’s 
operating performance in the following year.  
Broadly speaking, the empirical findings suggest that there is no causal relationship between the 
unemployment insurance benefits on one year and the levels of debt the forward year. Furthermore, 
regarding the second question, the evidence suggests that there is a negative relationship between 
the two variables, that is, an increase in the UI benefits of a country are associated with decreases 
in the operating performance of the firms the next year. 
Throughout the last decades, the human resources of a firm have been suffering substantial changes 
in terms of their importance to a company. Progressively the idea spreads that, when treated 
properly and with fairness, the human capital will constitute a crucially important competitive 
advantage for the organization. In spite of this, there have been several studies on how 
unemployment costs and unemployment risk are affected by the corporate structure and corporate 
financing decisions of a firm, although, the inverse relationship is still, to a certain extent, 
somewhat uncharted. 
The findings of this study come with several limitations already mentioned in previous sections, as 
well as room for future research in order to improve and to expand the topic of unemployment risk 
on corporate finance. Notwithstanding, this paper alone provides relevant new insights for the 
European context as well as to the - not so explored - effect a variation in the unemployment costs 
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Table 7 – Maximum unemployment insurance (UI) benefit per week, in Euros, 2001-2016. The values presented in the table are not 
adjusted for inflation. The information was manually extracted from the OECD “Benefits and Wages: Country policy descriptions” 
website. Some relevant assumptions were made and already mentioned in Section 3.1 – “Data and empirical framework - 
unemployment insurance benefits and corporate borrowing”, as well as throughout the paper. 
Countries 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Austria 249,55 255,08 257,18 262,64 269,43 275,17 282,87 292,39 
Belgium 176,40 223,07 227,53 232,07 236,72 241,46 248,75 253,72 
Czech Republic 39,60 39,60 39,60 39,60 43,15 44,93 107,82 117,25 
Denmark 394,11 404,84 417,57 429,64 438,35 447,06 457,79 471,19 
France 1209,69 1248,37 1290,83 1314,19 1314,19 1314,19 1471,82 1471,82 
Germany 615,91 650,77 650,77 713,08 720,00 726,92 726,92 733,85 
Greece 61,44 64,56 64,56 64,56 75,98 75,98 84,75 96,46 
Hungary 23,65 25,96 28,16 29,97 31,89 53,82 56,40 59,42 
Iceland 113,58 123,25 129,41 148,31 152,76 185,49 190,89 197,19 
Ireland 108,56 108,56 124,80 134,80 148,80 165,80 185,80 197,80 
Italy 175,35 175,35 182,59 186,18 189,14 191,72 194,78 198,13 
Luxembourg 726,20 755,21 797,88 814,46 846,21 867,36 905,93 928,58 
Netherlands 765,35 795,00 825,00 838,50 838,50 851,65 873,20 899,50 
Norway 388,25 409,24 430,23 443,87 458,56 475,13 504,74 504,74 
Poland 25,65 26,81 27,08 27,13 28,08 28,67 28,96 29,70 
Portugal 231,36 240,93 246,88 253,11 259,41 267,16 275,44 282,05 
Spain 200,63 204,68 208,85 185,97 189,73 193,48 201,60 243,54 
Sweden 300,88 340,38 340,38 340,38 340,38 340,38 331,02 331,02 
Switzerland 1797,00 1797,00 1797,00 1797,00 1797,00 1797,00 1797,00 2119,80 
United Kingdom (UK) 60,52 61,54 62,33 63,47 64,10 65,53 67,47 69,00 
Countries 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria 306,67 312,90 318,71 324,52 330,33 336,56 338,10 367,64 
Belgium 305,51 305,51 311,63 328,26 369,99 369,99 369,99 382,11 
Czech Republic 121,22 123,56 126,86 129,20 128,49 134,21 136,72 141,95 
Denmark 485,94 504,03 513,42 528,16 536,88 546,26 536,88 560,34 
France 1517,47 1517,47 1517,47 1608,76 1608,76 1667,91 1667,91 1693,16 
Germany 747,69 747,69 761,54 775,38 775,38 823,85 837,69 837,69 
Greece 104,83 104,83 106,50 83,08 83,08 83,08 83,08 83,08 
Hungary 61,57 63,29 67,17 66,74 70,32 72,83 75,35 79,65 
Iceland 249,83 249,83 269,76 279,29 288,37 298,75 307,71 337,56 
Ireland 204,30 196,00 188,00 188,00 188,00 188,00 188,00 188,00 
Italy 204,53 206,07 206,07 214,91 266,05 268,98 269,52 269,52 
Luxembourg 970,82 995,08 1013,98 1045,81 1088,03 1108,29 1109,40 1109,40 
Netherlands 915,75 933,25 951,60 965,45 979,80 991,40 991,40 1019,25 
Norway 550,60 571,45 598,53 620,48 620,48 667,68 680,49 699,48 
Poland 30,94 39,92 40,96 42,73 44,32 44,72 44,72 44,72 
Portugal 290,23 290,23 290,23 290,23 241,86 241,86 241,86 241,86 
Spain 248,41 250,89 250,89 250,89 250,89 250,89 250,89 250,89 
Sweden 331,02 331,02 331,02 331,02 331,02 331,02 331,02 442,80 
Switzerland 2119,80 2119,80 2119,80 2119,80 2119,80 2119,80 2119,80 2493,37 
United Kingdom (UK) 73,34 74,64 76,93 80,92 81,71 82,50 83,31 83,31 
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Table 8 - Maximum unemployment insurance (UI) benefit per week, in Euros, 2001-2016. The values presented in the table are 
adjusted for November 2018 inflation levels. The information was manually extracted from the OECD “Benefits and Wages: 
Country policy descriptions” website. Some relevant assumptions were made and already mentioned in Section 3.1 – “Data and 
empirical framework - unemployment insurance benefits and corporate borrowing”, as well as throughout the paper. 
Countries Inflation Nov 2018 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Austria 2,21 361,86 361,89 356,98 356,67 357,98 357,70 359,76 363,83 
Belgium 2,78 281,15 345,92 343,29 340,68 338,11 335,55 336,32 333,77 
Czech Republic 2,02 55,63 54,53 53,45 52,39 55,96 57,12 134,35 143,21 
Denmark 0,79 450,52 459,16 469,88 479,68 485,57 491,33 499,18 509,77 
France 1,89 1663,06 1684,41 1709,39 1708,04 1676,36 1645,26 1808,43 1774,89 
Germany 2,27 902,06 931,96 911,28 976,36 963,96 951,63 930,51 918,52 
Greece 0,99 72,64 75,58 74,84 74,10 86,36 85,52 94,46 106,45 
Hungary 3,15 40,07 42,64 44,84 46,27 47,73 78,09 79,33 81,03 
Iceland 3,74 212,03 221,78 224,47 247,98 246,21 288,19 285,89 284,67 
Ireland 0,6 120,18 119,46 136,52 146,58 160,83 178,14 198,44 209,99 
Italy 1,59 229,28 225,69 231,33 232,19 232,20 231,67 231,69 231,99 
Luxembourg 2,26 1061,83 1079,84 1115,64 1113,66 1131,50 1134,15 1158,40 1161,12 
Netherlands 2,03 1077,05 1096,51 1115,25 1110,95 1088,84 1083,92 1089,23 1099,71 
Norway 3,49 695,64 708,52 719,74 717,52 716,27 717,12 736,12 711,30 
Poland 1,92 35,44 36,35 36,02 35,41 35,96 36,02 35,70 35,92 
Portugal 0,86 267,62 276,31 280,71 285,35 289,95 296,07 302,65 307,27 
Spain 1,69 266,77 267,63 268,53 235,15 235,91 236,58 242,41 287,97 
Sweden 1,96 418,50 464,35 455,42 446,66 438,08 429,66 409,81 401,93 
Switzerland 0,92 2099,72 2080,58 2061,61 2042,82 2024,19 2005,74 1987,46 2323,10 
United Kingdom 2,1 86,17 85,82 85,13 84,90 83,98 84,09 84,80 84,94 
Countries Inflation Nov 2018 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria 2,21 373,35 372,69 371,41 370,00 368,48 367,31 361,02 384,07 
Belgium 2,78 391,02 380,45 377,57 386,96 424,36 412,88 401,71 403,65 
Czech Republic 2,02 145,12 145,00 145,92 145,67 142,00 145,39 145,17 147,74 
Denmark 0,79 521,60 536,78 542,49 553,69 558,42 563,73 549,70 569,23 
France 1,89 1795,99 1762,68 1729,98 1800,04 1766,65 1797,62 1764,27 1757,77 
Germany 2,27 915,08 894,76 891,11 887,17 867,48 901,24 896,04 876,16 
Greece 0,99 114,55 113,42 114,10 88,14 87,27 86,42 85,57 84,73 
Hungary 3,15 81,39 81,11 83,46 80,39 82,12 82,45 82,70 84,75 
Iceland 3,74 347,66 335,13 348,82 348,12 346,48 346,01 343,54 363,28 
Ireland 0,6 215,60 205,61 196,04 194,87 193,71 192,55 191,40 190,26 
Italy 1,59 235,73 233,79 230,13 236,25 287,89 286,50 282,58 278,16 
Luxembourg 2,26 1187,11 1189,88 1185,69 1195,88 1216,66 1211,93 1186,33 1160,11 
Netherlands 2,03 1097,31 1096,03 1095,34 1089,17 1083,37 1074,39 1053,01 1061,05 
Norway 3,49 749,76 751,91 760,98 762,29 736,58 765,88 754,25 749,16 
Poland 1,92 36,72 46,48 46,79 47,89 48,74 48,25 47,35 46,45 
Portugal 0,86 313,48 310,81 308,16 305,53 252,44 250,29 248,15 246,04 
Spain 1,69 288,85 286,89 282,12 277,43 272,82 268,29 263,83 259,45 
Sweden 1,96 394,21 386,63 379,20 371,91 364,76 357,74 350,87 460,33 
Switzerland 0,92 2301,92 2280,93 2260,14 2239,54 2219,12 2198,89 2178,85 2539,46 




Table 9 - Maximum unemployment insurance (UI) benefit duration, in weeks, 2001-2016. The information was manually extracted 
from the OECD “Benefits and Wages: Country policy descriptions” website. Some relevant assumptions were made and already 
mentioned in Section 3.1 – “Data and empirical framework - unemployment insurance benefits and corporate borrowing”, as well 
as throughout the paper. It was already mentioned previously, but it is worth noting again, the values for the maximum UI benefit 
duration for Belgium were assumed to be equal to the highest value in the table since in fact, Belgium has no limit in this variable. 
Countries 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Austria 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Belgium 261 261 261 261 261 261 261 261 
Czech Republic 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Denmark 209 209 209 209 209 209 209 209 
France 130 130 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Germany 78 78 78 78 78 52 52 52 
Greece 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Hungary 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Iceland 261 261 261 261 261 156 156 156 
Ireland 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 
Italy 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 35 
Luxembourg 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Netherlands 78 78 78 78 78 78 87 87 
Norway 156 156 104 104 104 104 104 104 
Poland 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Portugal 165 165 165 165 165 165 163 163 
Spain 104 104 104 103 103 103 103 103 
Sweden 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Switzerland 21 21 57 57 57 57 57 57 
United Kingdom 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Countries 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Belgium 261 261 261 261 261 261 261 261 
Czech Republic 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Denmark 209 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
France 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
Germany 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Greece 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Hungary 39 39 39 13 13 13 13 13 
Iceland 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 
Ireland 56 56 56 45 45 45 45 45 
Italy 35 35 35 35 35 35 43 43 
Luxembourg 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Netherlands 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 
Norway 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
Poland 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Portugal 163 163 163 103 103 103 103 103 
Spain 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 
Sweden 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Switzerland 57 57 37 37 37 37 37 57 
United Kingdom 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
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Table 10 – Correlation matrix with all variables used in the regressions. In Table 11 one can see the corresponding names for the 
codes presented below. 
 LMaxTot DebtMkt DebtBook LogIntCov PropFAss LogSales MktBook ROA Zscore GDPgr UnempR 
LMaxTot 1.000           
DebtMkt 0.111 1.000          
DebtBook 0.083 0.873 1.000         
LogIntCov -0.014 -0.645 -0.629 1.000        
PropFAss -0.069 0.376 0.330 -0.196 1.000       
LogSales 0.237 0.088 0.137 -0.051 0.035 1.000      
MktBook -0.068 -0.279 -0.061 0.214 -0.131 0.032 1.000     
ROA -0.056 -0.388 -0.293 0.570 -0.119 0.055 0.344 1.000    
Zscore -0.006 -0.352 -0.367 0.401 -0.177 0.195 0.153 0.434 1.000   
GDPgr -0.385 -0.201 -0.125 0.116 -0.014 -0.070 0.130 0.120 0.062 1.000  
UnempR -0.232 0.103 0.050 -0.114 0.050 -0.131 -0.079 -0.077 -0.080 -0.160 1.000 
 
Table 11 – Codes of the all the variables used in the regressions and their respective names. 
Codes Variables 
LMaxTot Natural logarithm of the maximum total benefit lagged 1-year 
DebtMkt Total debt-to-total market value of assets 
DebtBook Total debt-to-total market value of assets 
LogIntCov Natural logarithm of interest coverage 
PropFAss Proportion of fixed assets 
LogSales Natural logarithm of sales 
MktBook Total market-to-total book value 
ROA Return on assets 
ZScore Modified altman Z-score 
GDPgr Gross domestic product growth 
UnempR Unemployment Rate 
 
